New research by DroneShield has found that unauthorised drone activity at airports has moved beyond a theoretical threat.

The company surveyed international airports, aviation authorities, correctional facilities and port operators across North America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

DroneShield’s report Airspace Under Pressure: A Global Assessment of Counter-UAS Readiness Across Airports and Critical Infrastructure draws on direct survey responses from more than 20 airport and critical infrastructure operators worldwide.

The report has found that the detection gaps are systemic and severe: 70% of respondents identified detection capability gaps as a barrier to effective counter-UAS operations.

Regulatory, legal constraints also hamper counter-UAS: six in 10 (60%) of respondents also indicated that they lack the legal authority to take direct mitigation action against unauthorised drones, even when the threat to safety is clear and immediate. Other reasons cited as barriers to effective counter-UAS operations include integration complexity (at 48%) and training and preparedness (35%).

Respondents were also asked to describe their organisation’s counter-UAS operational objectives:

  • Full combination (Awareness + Detection + Tracking + Response): 57%
  • Detection-focused (Partial): 13%
  • Awareness only: 13%
  • Undefined / No formal plan: 17%
    • The responses reveal a critical structural problem: the gap between what organisations intend and what they have built.

Tom Adams, Director of Public Safety at DroneShield, said: “The primary Counter-UAS challenge in 2025 is not awareness of the threat, it is the capacity to convert awareness into authorised, coordinated, real-time action. Technology investment alone will not close this gap. Regulatory reform and operational integration must advance simultaneously.”

The report introduces a readiness maturity framework mapping respondents across two dimensions: objective maturity and operational capability. The majority of surveys operators cluster in two quadrants:

  • Prepared quadrant: 13 organisations had defined operational objectives and moderate counter-UAS capabilities.
    • These are typically larger airports and critical infrastructure operators who have invested in the problem and have structured frameworks in place. But even within this group, capability gaps remain. The Prepared quadrant describes a relative position, not an adequate one.
  • Partial quadrant: five organisations had operational objectives in place, but capability has not kept pace with the realities they face.
    • These operators face a specific risk: they have plans that they cannot execute with their current tools and authority.
  • Exposed quadrant: A meaningful minority (of three organisations) sit in the exposed quadrant: undefined objectives, minimal capability, and no formalised framework.
    • These organisations are at the greatest risk of managing a serious drone incident reactively, without established procedures, and with outcomes that are difficult to predict or control

Overall, the report argues that the defining differentiator in the years ahead will be whether organisations address these gaps systematically, before an incident forces an unplanned response; or reactively, under pressure, with consequences that cannot be fully controlled.

Airspace Under Pressure is available for download. The full report includes operator survey data, thematic analysis across five key capability dimensions, and a readiness maturity framework for self-assessment.

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